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RANDOM CANINE SNIFF SEARCHES Do NOT VIOLATE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
People v. Mayberry, 31 Cal. 3d 335, 644 P.2d 810,
182 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1982)
In the current split of authority over the scope of the fourth amend-
ment's' protection against unreasonable' searches3 the California
Supreme Court, in People v. Mayberry,4 sided with those courts holding
1. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
2. "[Wihat the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable
searches and seizures." Elkins v. United States, 346 U.S. 206 (1970). See Amsterdam, Perspectives
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 388 (1974); Fankel, Concerning Searches and
Seizures, 34 HARV. L. REV. 361, 366 (1921). The Supreme Court has consistently maintained that
a search is unreasonable unless authorized by a search warrant. E.g., Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948). The Supreme
Court, however, has carved out a number of "well-delineated exceptions" from this rule. Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The exceptions may be separated into six major catego-
ries. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (incident to arrest); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (consent); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970)
(movable vehicle); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (stop and frisk); Harris v. United States,
390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (plain view); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (exigent
circumstances).
3. "The Supreme Court, quite understandably, has never managed to set out a comprehen-
sive definition of the word 'searches' as it is used in the Fourth Amendment." I W. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 223 (1978). One explanation
is offered in 79 C.J.S. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES § 1 (1952):
[T]he term implies some exploratory investigation, or an invasion and quest, a looking
for or seeking out. The quest may be secret, intrusive, or accomplished by force, and it
has been held that a search implies some sort of force, either actual or constructive, much
or little. A search implies a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed and
that the object searched for has been hidden or intentionally put out of the way. While it
has been said that ordinarily searching is a function of sight, it is generally held that the
mere looking at that which is open to view is not a "search."
Id. at 775. Accord Brown v. State, 372 P.2d 785 (Alaska 1962); People v. Holloway, 230 Cal. App.
2d 834, 41 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1964); People v. Exum, 382 Ill. 204, 47 N.E.2d 56 (1943); State v.
Coolidge, 106 N.H. 186, 208 A.2d 322 (1965); State v. Smith, 242 N.C. 297, 87 S.E.2d 593 (1955).
Black's Law Dictionary defines a "search" as:
An examination of a man's house or other buildings or premises, or of his person, or of
his vehicle, aircraft, etc., with a view to the discovery of contraband or illicit or stolen
property, or some evidence of guilt to be used in the prosecution of a criminal action for
some crime or offense with which he is charged.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1211 (5th ed. 1979).
4. 31 Cal. 3d 335, 644 P.2d 810, 182 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1982).
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that the use of police-trained dogs to randomly inspect and detect the
odor of narcotics emanating from airport luggage does not constitute a
search within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
The San Diego Police Department's Narcotics Task Force routinely
used a police-trained narcotics detection dog to check all luggage from
incoming flights originating in Florida.5  During such an inspection 6 a
drug detection dog "alerted ' 7 a member of the Narcotics Task Force to
appellant Mayberry's luggage, indicating the presence of illegal narcot-
ics. 8 After Mayberry claimed his luggage, police notified him that a dog
had "alerted" the officers to the suitcase, and that they would search
Mayberry's luggage after obtaining a warrant.9 The officers then re-
quested that the appellant expedite the process and consent to the
search.' 0
After the search uncovered drugs, police charged Mayberry with
transporting and possessing marijuana." At trial, the appellant moved
5. The San Diego Police claim that statistically there is a high probability that luggage com-
ing off incoming flights originating in Florida will contain narcotics. At Mayberry's trial, the
prosecution offered as evidence police testimony that in 1979 the police found drugs on twenty-
five flights, fourteen of which, or fifty-six percent, originated in Florida. However, during that
same year a total of 1,825 flights flew from Florida to San Diego. Therefore, less than one percent
(0.76%) of the Florida flights were found to have narcotics aboard. 117 Cal. App. 3d 360, 361, 172
Cal. Rptr. 629, 630 (1981), vacated, 31 Cal. 3d 335, 644 P.2d 810, 182 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1982).
6. The luggage inspected was from a flight originating in Miami, Florida. Mayberry had
boarded the flight in Dayton, Ohio. Id.
7. When a trained dog "alerts" his handler to the concealed presence of contraband-by
means of a trained action such as biting, snarling, pawing or throwing his head back-he is indi-
cating his recognition of the particular scents of various contraband. See United States v. Fulero,
498 F.2d 748, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per curiam); United States v. Solis, 393 F. Supp. 325, 326
(C.D. Cal. 1975), rev'don other ground, 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976); People v. Furman, 30 Cal.
App. 3d 454, 456, 106 Cal. Rptr. 366, 368 (1973). For a discussion of the training and reliability of
drug detecting dogs, see United States v. Solis: Have the Government's Supersniffers Come Down
With a Case of Constitutional Nasal CongestionZ 13 SAN DiEOO L. REV. 410, 414-18 (1976).
8. 117 Cal. App. 3d 360, 361, 172 Cal. Rptr. 629, 630 (1981).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. Appellant was charged with violation of the CAL. [HEALTH & SAFETY] CODE
§§ 11,357a, 11,359, 11,360a (Deering Supp. 1982). Section 11,357(a) provides:
Except as authorized by law, every person who possesses any concentrated cannabis
shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not more than one
year or by a fine of not more than. . .($ 100), or by both such fine and imprisonment, or
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison.
Section 11,359 provides in part:
Every person who possesses for sale any marijuana, except as otherwise provided by law,
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison ....
Section 11,360(a) provides in part:
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to suppress the marijuana as the product of an illegal search and
seizure." Mayberry alleged that the dog's sniffing his luggage consti-
tuted an unreasonable exploratory search. 13 The trial court denied the
motion,' 4 and the California Supreme Court affirmed 5 and held: The
[Elvery person who transports, imports into this state, sells, furnishes, administers, or
gives away, or offers to transport. . . . shall be punished by imprisonment. . . .
12. People v. Mayberry, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 361, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 630 (1981). The Califor-
nia Penal Code states that "[a] defendant may move. ., to suppress as evidence any tangible or
intangible thing obtained as a result of a search or seizure on.. . the following grounds: "(1)...
The search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable." CAL. [PENAL] CODE § 1538.5(a)(1)
(Deering Supp. 1982).
In addition, appellant claimed state constitutional protection. Art. 1, § 13 of the California
Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated; and a warrant may not issue
except on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized.
CAL CONST. art. I, § 13. Cf U.S. Const. amend. IV.
A claim that evidence has been seized illegally, that is, obtained in violation of a constitutional
provision, automatically implicates the exclusionary rule. Under the exclusionary rule, evidence
obtained in violation of the privileges guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution must be excluded at
trial. BLACiCs LAW DICTIONARY 506 (5th ed. 1979). The exclusionary rule was first introduced in
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In Weeks the Supreme Court held that evidence
seized in violation of the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures could not be used in federal court. The Court, in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1963),
extended the exclusionary rule to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, holding that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Con-
stitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court." Id. at 655.
For a comprehensive discussion of the exclusionary rule, see Geller, Enforcing the Fourth
Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatie, 1975 WASh. U.L.Q. 621; Kaplan, The
Limits ofthe Exduonary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027 (1974); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary
Rule in Search and Seiure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665 (1970); Comment, Admisibility oflllegally
Seized Eyidence--the Federal Excldusiomry Rule-A Historical Analysis, 38 U. DET. L. 635
(1961). Seegenerally 1 W. LAFAVEupra note 3, at § 1.1-.11.
13. People v. Mayberry, 31 Cal. 3d at 339, 644 P.2d at 812, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 619 (1982).
14. Id. at 339, 644 P.2d at 812, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 619. The trial court reasoned that the
statistical information regarding the flow of narcotics from Florida to San Diego was a sufficient
basis upon which the police could base their reasonable suspicion that narcotics would be found
on board such flights. Id. See supr note 8. The court went on to conclude that a dog sniffsearch
constituted a minimal intrusion, justified by reasonable police efforts to curtail the flow of illegal
narcotics. Id.
On appeal the judgment was reversed. People v. Mayberry, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 362, 172 Cal.
Rptr. at 631 (1981). The appellate court stressed that in order for a sniff search to be upheld, it
must be shown that the investigation was not a "general exploratory search" Id. at 361, 172 Cal.
Rptr. at 630 (citing People v. Nagdeman, 110 Cal. App. 3d 404, 410, 168 Cal. Rptr. 16, 19-20
(1980); People v. Williams, 51 Cal. App. 3d 346, 349, 124 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255 (1975)). Therefore,
the police must demonstrate that there existed "some preknowledge or reasonably strong suspi-
cion that contraband is to be found in a particular location. . . ." Id. at 361-62, 172 Cal. Rptr. at
630-31 (quoting People v. Evans, 65 Cal. App. 3d 924, 933, 134 Cal. Rptr. 436, 441 (1977)). The
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use of police-trained dogs to detect the odor of narcotics in airport lug-
gage is a limited, unintrusive investigation which does not constitute a
search within the meaning of the fourth amendment.1 6
The fourth amendment primarily protects individuals against "un-
reasonable searches and seizures."'17  To claim protection under the
fourth amendment an individual" must show that a search of constitu-
tional dimension1 9 actually occurred and that the search was unreason-
court concluded that the statistical data proffered failed to meet this requirement and the appel-
lant's motion to suppress was erroneously denied. Id. at 631.
15. People v. Mayberry, 31 Cal. 3d 335, 644 P.2d 810, 812 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1982).
16. Id. at 340, 644 P.2d at 813, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
17. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971) ("The security of one's
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amend-
ment-is basic to a free society.") (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)); Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967) (quoting Wolf in reference to a conversation recorded by an
electronic device); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) ("At the very core [of the
fourth amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion"); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958) ("the
essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment [is] to shield the citizen from unwarranted intrusions
into his privacy"); Note, The Neglected Fourth Amendment Problem in Arrest Entries, 23 STAN. L.
REV. 995, 997 (1971) ("[Ihe right to be secure in the privacy of one's home against arbitrary
governmental intrusions is the heart of the fourth amendment").
The fourth amendment was inserted in the Bill of Rights as direct opposition to the indiscrimi-
nate searches and seizures conducted in England under the authority of "writs of assistance" and
"general warrants." General warrants were so called because they failed to state with any particu-
larity those against whom they could be used. Writs of assistance, which were general warrants
that described the object, but not the place, of the search, and which expired only upon the death
of the issuing monarch, were used in the colonies by customs officials attempting to enforce the
trade legislation of Parliament. In 1760 the American colonists rebelled against the use of writs of
assistance when, upon the death of King George II, new writs of assistance were to be issued en
masse. See N. LAsSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTrrTUTION 51-59 (1970).
The first American provision against general warrants was section 10 of Virginia Bill of Rights
of 1776, which reads:
That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be commanded to search
suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons
not named, or whose offence is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are
grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted.
2 B.P. POORE, THE FEDERAL STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER OR-
GANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 1909 (1877). In addition to Virginia, six other states had
constitutional provisions which served as precedents leading to the adoption of the fourth amend-
ment. See N. LAsSON, supra, 79-83.
18. In approaching the issue of whether there exists a privacy right to invoke the fourth
amendment there must be a determination of whether the aggrieved party has "standing" to bring
a fourth amendment claim. Unless the individual possesses a personal interest in the item
searched, he has no standing to invoke the exclusionary rule. C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CASES AND CONCEPTS 96 (1980).
19. For a search to violate the fourth amendment it must be the product of governmental
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able.2" Because of the vagueness in the wording of the fourth
amendment, 2' however, the courts have not articulated a general rule
which effectively distinguishes between a search and other intrusions
by police.22
Historically, the Supreme Court adopted the view that for there to
have been a fourth amendment search the police must have physically
intruded into a "constitutionally protected area."23 The Court defined
these areas as penumbras of those expressly stated in the fourth amend-
ment itself: "persons, houses, papers, and effects." 24 In Olmstead v.
United States,25 the Supreme Court narrowly defined what constitutes
a protected area, holding that the fourth amendment did not cover the
seizure of conversations through wiretapping.26 The Court in Olmstead
action and the victim must have possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the items
searched. See generally C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 18, at § 4.02.
20. See supra note 2. This requires determining whether a valid warrant has been issued,
and, if not, whether the criteria for one of the six exceptions to the warrant requirement has been
met. C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 18, at § 4.03.
21. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 353 (1974).
"But the fourth amendment is not clear. The work is giving concrete and contemporary meaning
to that brief, vague, general unilluminating text .. " Id.
22. Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Use of Canines to Detect Evidence of Crime, 44
FORDHAM L. REV. 973, 983 (1976).
23. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). In holding that the police officers vio-
lated the fourth amendment by using a "spike mike," an electronic listening device which turned
the defendant's heating system into a microphone, the Court stated, "But decision here does not
turn upon the technicality of a trespass upon a party wall as a matter of local law. It is based upon
the reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area." Id at 512 (emphasis ad-
ded). See also On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 751-54 (1952) (recording of a conversation
in the defendant's place of business by a microphone concealed on a person invited onto the
premises held not to violate the fourth amendment); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-
36 (1942) (recording of a conversation by placing listening devices against the wall of an adjoining
office held not to violate the fourth amendment); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464,
466 (1928) (recording of a telephone conversation by placing listening devices on telephone wires
leading to the defendant's house held not to violate the fourth amendment). For a further discus-
sion of Olnstead, see infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
24. The Supreme Court concerned itself primarily with the physical area searched and its
relation to the defendant. Within the penumbra of "persons" were bodies, Schmerber v. Califor-
nia, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); and clothing, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1966). "Houses" extended to
warehouses, See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); apartments, Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S.
158 (1964); hotel rooms, Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); garages, Taylor v. United
States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932); business offices, United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); and
stores, Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921). "Papers and effects" included automobiles,
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); and letters, Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
25. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
26. In Olmstead government officers obtained evidence of a conspiracy by tapping the tele-
phone lines of the conspirators and reading their conversations. 277 U.S. at 456-57. The Court
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established that a defendant must show both a physical, trespassory
intrusion and the seizure of a tangible object in order to invoke the
fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches.27 Ini-
tially, the Supreme Court applied this test strictly, refusing to circum-
vent these criteria by drawing factual distinctions.2 8
In 1967, however, the Court pronounced the end of the physical in-
trusion standard in Katz v. United States.39 The Supreme Court con-
cluded in Katz that the proper test was not whether police had
physically invaded a constitutionally protected area, but rather whether
the government had violated the privacy upon which an individual jus-
tifiably relied.30 In stating that the fourth amendment "protects people,
held that the wiretapping did not violate the fourth amendment reasoning that "[t]he insertions
were made without trespass upon any property of the defendants." 277 U.S. at 457. In addition,
the Court reasoned that since the evidence was secured merely by the use of the sense of hearing,
there was no seizure. Id at 464. In finding that there was no entry into the defendant's premises
the Court concluded that the fourth amendment "can not be extended and expanded to include
telephone wires reaching to the whole world. . . ." Id. at 465.
27. The Court stated-
The Amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material things-the person, the
house, his papers or his effects. The description of the warrant necessary to make the
proceeding lawful is that it must specify the place to be searched and the person or things
to be seized.
Id. at 464. The Court later added-
Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many Federal decisions brought to our
attention hold the 4th Amendment to have been violated as against a defendant unless
there has been an official search and seizure of his person or such a seizure of his papers
or his tangible material effects or an actual physical invasion of his house "or outlage"
for the purpose of making a seizure.
Id. at 466. See also supra note 2. The "act of physically taking and removing tangible personal
property is generally a 'seizure."' 68 AM. Jug. 2d Searches and Seizures § 8, at 667 (1973).
28. E.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438-39 (1963) (recording of a conversation in
the defendant's place of business by a tape recording device concealed on a person invited onto
the premises held not a fourth amendment violation); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 753-
54 (1952) (same); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942) (recording of a conversation
by placing listening devices against the wall of an adjoining office held not a fourth amendment
violation).
29. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
30. Id at 353. In Katz FBI agents bugged a public telephone booth and recorded petitioner's
end of his phone conversations. These recordings provided the basis for an indictment charging
the petitioner with transmitting wagering information across state lines in violation of a federal
statute. Id. at 348. In reversing petitioner's conviction, the Supreme Court held that by electroni-
cally listening and recording these conversations, the FBI agents violated the privacy upon which
petitioner had justifiably relied while using the telephone booth. Such an intrusion constituted a
search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Id. at 353. In conclusion the
Court gave no constitutional significance to the fact that there was no penetration of the walls of
the phone booth. Id
In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan described the test as having two requirements: "first,
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not places, 31 the Court recognized no constitutional significance in the
presence or absence of a physical intrusion32 of the person or property.
Katz thus raised, but did not decide, the question of what types of
sense-enhanced activities the Court would regard as searches under the
fourth amendment.
Ten years later in United States v. Chadwick,33 the Court applied the
Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test to a warrantless search of a
double-locked footlocker.' The Court concluded that luggage is in-
tended as a repository for personal effects. As such, the fourth amend-
ment equally protects the person who safeguards personal possessions
by locking them in a piece of luggage and the person who locks the
doors of his home.35 In its application of this notion in Arkansas v.
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' Id at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977) (legitimate and reasonable
expectation of privacy protects luggage in trunk of car from warrantless governmental intrusion);
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1973) (no legitimate and reasonable expectation of
privacy in the characteristics of a person's voice); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 332-36
(1973) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in voluntarily surrendered documents); United States
v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971) (simultaneous recording of conversations not violation of
justifiable expectation of privacy). For an in-depth discussion of Justice Harlan's two require-
ments, see W. LAFAvE, supra note 3, at 229-34; Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 384-85.
31. 389 U.S. at 351.
32. Id. at 353. The Court's decision was undoubtedly influenced by the increasing number of
surveillance devices which were being used by law enforcement officials to intrude on an individ-
ual's privacy without any physical invasion. The ground had been laid for this decision by Justice
Douglas in his concurring opinion in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (Doug-
las, J., concurring). "The depth of the penetration of the electronic device.., is not the measure
of the injury.... mhe command of the Fourth Amendment [should not] be limited by nice
distinctions turning on the kind of electronic equipment employed." Id at 513 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
33. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
34. Id. at 11. Federal agents seized the footlocker as it was being placed in the trunk of a car
after a narcotics dog had signalled the presence of narcotics inside the footlocker. Sometime after
the footlocker was safe in official custody, the federal agents opened it, without obtaining a war-
rant, and discovered marijuana. The Court, in granting the appellant's motion to suppress the
narcotics as fruits of a warrantless search, held that the factors which diminish the privacy aspects
of an automobile do not apply to a footlocker, although a footlocker has some of the mobile
characteristics that support warrantless searches of automobiles, a person's expectations of privacy
are substantially greater in personal luggage than in an automobile. Id. at 13.
35. Id. at 11. "No less than one who locks the doors of his home against intruders, one who
safeguards his personal possessions in this manner is due the protections of the Fourth Amend-
ment Warrant Clause." Id.
The Court's holding reafrmed the general principle that closed packages and containers may
not be searched without a warrant and declined to extend the "automobile exception" to permit a
warrantless search of any movable container found in a public place. See supra note 2. See also
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Sanders,36 the Court further noted that the presence or absence of a
lock on the luggage played no part in determining the subjective expec-
tation of privacy." The Court relied on the objective nature of the
container as personal luggage as the critical factor in determining
whether a privacy interest existed.38
In its effort to further define what constitutes a fourth amendment
search, the Court, in Harris v. United States,39 held that the police may
seize any object that comes within their "plain view" as they legiti-
mately go about their business.' The Court concluded that an officer's
actions in response to that which he sees before him do not constitute a
search and therefore are not subject to the restrictions of the fourth
amendment.41 In cases following Harris the lower federal courts have
extended by analogy the parameters of the "plain view" doctrine42 to
include sounds43 and odors."
United States v. Vickers, 599 F.2d 132, 133 (6th Cir. 1979) (illegal to search locked footlocker
taken from automobile); United States v. Stevie, 582 F.2d 1175, 1178 (8th Cir. 1978) (individual's
expectation of privacy in contents of luggage is entitled to fourth amendment protection regardless
of location inside automobile).
36. 442 U.S. 753 (1979). The Supreme Court has questioned some of its reasoning in Sanders
but the Court still adheres to its holding. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
37. 442 U.S. at 762-63 n.9.
38. Id. The Court found the fact that the luggage was seized from an automobile to be of no
constitutional significance. The Court reasoned that a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
contents of personal luggage is not diminished simply because the owner is arrested in a public
place. Id. at 766-67 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
39. 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (per curiam).
40. Id. at 236.
41. Id. The plain view doctrine is intended to provide a basis for making a seizure without a
warrant. See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 392 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (consent of accomplice to search
allows plain view admission of evidence gained against defendant); Kerr v. California, 374 U.S.
23, 43 (1963) (discovery of marijuana on kitchen counter during lawful arrest).
The concern here is with plain view as descriptive of a situation which establishes that there has
been no search at all within the meaning of the fourth amendment. For an in-depth discussion of
the plain view doctrine, see W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, at § 22.
42. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433 (1971), is the case most often cited in support
of the plain view doctrine. Coolidge established the two elements that must be met to invoke the
plain view doctrine: first, the officer must have been previously authorized to be in the position
which afforded him the view of the object; second, the officer must discover the object inadver-
tently. Id. at 466-67, 469. For a useful discussion of these requirements, see Moylan, The Plain
View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great "Search Incident" Geography Battle, 26 MERCER L.
Rnv. 1047, 1073-78, 1081-88 (1975).
Courts have applied the doctrine to legitimize use of flashlights, United States v. Wright, 449
F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1971); binoculars, United States v. Minton, 488 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); and searchlights, United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
43. E.g., United States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071 (10th Cir. 1973) (no search occurred when, by
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The Supreme Court has not ruled on the question of whether a sniff
search violates the fourth amendment. Without guidance from the
Court, lower federal and state courts have divided on the question.
One of the earliest cases to scrutinize the propriety of sniff inspections
under the fourth amendment was United States v. Bronstein.4 In hold-
ing that no fourth amendment search had occurred, the Second Circuit
proffered two theories.46 Judge Mulligan, writing for the court, rea-
soned that detection by a trained dog is no different from detection by
an officer through the use of his own olfactory senses.47 Judge Mans-
field, in a concurring opinion, rejected the majority's "plain smell"
analysis, arguing that the situation was analogous to Katz.48 He based
his concurrence on his conclusion that the action of a sniffing dog does
not invade an individual's lower expectation of privacy in luggage
turned over to a common carrier.49 Judge Mansfield cautioned, how-
lying prone at the connecting door, federal agents overheard incriminating remarks made by
conspirators).
44. Eg., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S 102, 111 (1965) (upheld warrant based on sight,
smell, and sound indicating operation of a distillery within house); United States v. Sentovich, 677
F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1982) (warrant granted based on smelling of marijuana in suitcase by
police officer); United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 397, 398 (9th Cir. 1974) (no "'reasonable expec-
tation of privacy' from lawfully positioned agents 'with inquisitive nostrils' "); United States v.
Martinez-Miramontes, 494 F.2d 808, 810 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974) (detection of
marijuana by smelling crevice where trunk closes not a fourth amendment search).
Many courts support the theory that a dog sniff inspection does not constitute a search but may
provide probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. Eg., United States v. Venema, 563
F.2d 1003, 1005 (10th Cir. 1977) (dog sniffing the air around a locker not a search); United States
v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880, 881 (9th Cir. 1976) (dog sniffing air outside trailer not a search); United
States v. Fulero, 498 F.2d 748, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (held "frivolous" to contend that dog sniffing
air around footlocker in bus depot is a search).
45. 521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1975).
46. Id. at 461. The canine sniff was instigated after drug enforcement agents became suspi-
cious of defendant's activities in the airport terminal. This was the first case of its kind to be heard
by the Second Circuit. The court noted the District of Columbia's Circuit Court opinion in
United States v. Fulero, 498 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1974), which described as "frivolous," the conten-
tion that a dog sniff was a search. United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 459 (2d Cir.), cer.
denied 424 U.S. 918 (1975).
47. 521 F.2d at 471. The court noted the well-known fact that marijuana has an offensive
and pungent odor and the fact that it was packed in moth balls was undoubtedly to hide that odor
from detection by drug enforcement agents. The court found no reason to distinguish detection by
a sensitive and schooled canine from detection by a drug enforcement agent. Id.
48. 521 F.2d 459, 464 (Mansfield, J., concurring). Judge Mansfield stressed that the police
officers did not see or smell anything, nor were their senses enhanced. He concluded that the
officers' senses were replaced by the more sensitive canine nose, drawing an analogy to the use of
the hidden microphone used to detect sounds otherwise inaudible, the illegality of which has long
been established. Id.
49. Id. at 465. Judge Mansfield stated that:
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ever, that dragnet sniff searches"° would violate society's normal expec-
tation of privacy. 1
In 1981 the federal courts returned to the issue of sniff searches. The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Goldstein,52 rational-
ized its holding that airport sniff searches are constitutionally permissi-
ble by concluding that airline passengers' reasonable expectation of
privacy in their luggage does not extend to the airspace surrounding
that luggage.5 3 The court reasoned that the use of a trained dog's sensi-
tive nose' cannot convert a sniff of the exterior of a suitcase into a
search.5
[Olne who consigns luggage to the common luggage area of a public carrier, airport or
similar facility cannot expect to enjoy as much privacy with respect to the bag as he
would with respect to his person or property carried by him personally into, on or from
the carrier or facility....
Since a person's expectation of privacy with respect to his baggage declines as the
anticipated public access to the baggage increases, it is not unreasonable, where the po-
lice have reasonable grounds to suspect the presence of contraband, to permit use of an
external method or device to determine whether the baggage contains contraband.
Id. See also United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9, 12 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923
(1981) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in luggage when it is subject to inspection for the
protection of public safety); United States v. Burns, 624 F.2d 95, 101 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 954 (1980) (dog sniffing of locked briefcase not a fourth amendment search).
50. Dragnet searches are indiscriminate exploratory searches seeking to uncover any evi-
dence of criminal activity. See generally Note, Fourth Amendment-Searches--Use of Canine to
Detect Drug Paraphernalia on School Children is an Unreasonable Search Under the Fourth
Amendment, 9 AM. J. CriM. L. 127 (1981).
51. 521 F.2d at 465 (Mansfield, J., concurring). "However, I would strictly limit such a
search to cases where there are grounds for suspicion, . . . and would not permit a wholesale
examination of all baggage in the hope that a crime might be detected." Id.
52. 635 F.2d 356 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 452 U.S. 962 (1981).
53. Id at 361. Goldrtein is distinguishable from the previously discussed cases involving
dragnet sniff searches. In Goldstein, after a drug enforcement agent observed that the appellant
met certain aspects of the drug courier profile, he decided to use a trained dog to examine appel-
lant's bags. Id. at 359. The court stated that the officers were not required to have a reasonable
suspicion before subjecting the luggage to a sniff search. Id. at 360. However, the court went on
and concluded that because the defendant met certain aspects of the drug courier profile, the
officers had probable cause. Id. at 361.
The court noted the decisions in Bronstein, 521 F.2d at 462, and United States v. Sullivan, 625
F.2d 9, 13 (4th Cir. 1980), which held that because of airport security measures passengers have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in their checked baggage, but declined to reaffirm that conclu-
sion. 635 F.2d at 361 n.7.
54. It has been shown that a dog's nose is eight times more sensitive than a human's. Eg.,
United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880, 881 (9th Cir. 1976).
55. Id. at 361. The court cited Sullivan for the reasoning that because an agent's own un-
aided detection of the odor of controlled substances would not constitute a search, "the agent's use
of a dog's more enhanced olfactory sense cannot convert a sniff of the exterior of those suitcases
into a search." Id. (citing United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9, 13 (4th Cir. 1980)).
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The following year, in United States v. Beale,-6 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals expressly rejected the application of the plain view
doctrine to sniff searches.5 7 The court, finding the use of a trained dog
more closely analogous to the use of an independent detection device,58
cited Katz and its progeny 9 for the proposition that the dog's sense of
smell replaces rather than enhances an officer's own senses and thus
constitutes an invasion into the owner's expectation of privacy regard-
ing his luggage °.6  The court acknowledged the highly discriminating 61
and minimally intrusive qualities of the canine nose, but concluded
that this merely diminished rather than obliterated the intrusion. 2 In
expressly rejecting the Fifth Circuit's holding in Goldstein, the court
stated that after the Supreme Court's holdings in Katz, Chadwick, and
Sanders, it is untenable to assert that a passenger's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy does not extend to the airspace surrounding his
luggage.63
When faced with virtually the same facts as those in Beale, the Sec-
56. 674 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1982).
57. Id at 1333-34. While on duty at the Fort Lauderdale Airport, Detective Berks noted that
the appellants were acting suspiciously. Id. at 1328. After asking appellants a few questions, and
learning of previous drug arrests, Detective Berks released a police-trained dog in the baggage
area in the vicinity of appellants' bags. Id. at 1328-29. The dog alerted the detective to one of
appellants' bags. Id. In holding that a dog sniff is a fourth amendment search, the court found
the analogy between the use of a canine's acute sense of smell and the use of a flashlight or
binoculars "inapt." Id. at 1333.
58. Id. at 1333. The court reasoned that the dog does not amplify its handler's perception; it
replaces it. Id.
59. The court noted that since Katz, the use of most forms of independent detection devices
has uniformly been held to constitute a search. Id at 1333 n. 12 (citing United States v. Henry, 615
F.2d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1980) (x-ray scan) and United States v. Alabrado, 495 F.2d 799, 805-06
(2d Cir. 1974) (magnetometer)).
60. Id. at 1333. The court stated that the sense enhancing devices which have generally been
permitted are those which are commercially available, which citizens might expect members of the
public as well as law enforcement officials to possess and which are used in locations in which the
ordinary citizen might otherwise observe the property or activity. Id. at 1333 n.12.
61. Unlike the dragnet detection devices, that is, x-ray scans and magnetometers, the dog
detects only illegal narcotics. Id. at 1334. See generally Peebles, The Uninvited Canine Nose and
the Right to Privacy: Some Thoughts on Katz and Dogs, 11 GA. L. REv. 75 (1976).
62. Id at 1334 n.13. The court paraphrased Katz stating, "[W]hat Beale sought to exclude
when he locked his suitcase was not only the intruding human eye-it was also the intruding
canine nose." Id. at 1334. The court concluded that no matter what an individual conceals within
his luggage, he has a right to assume "that a trained canine nose will not broadcast its incriminat-
ing contents to the authorities." Id. See generally Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Use of
Canines to Detect Evidence of Crime, 44 FoRDHAM L. REv. 973 (1976).
63. 674 F.2d at 1335 n.20.
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ond Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Waltzer, I rejected the
Beale decision and held that canine sniffing does not intrude on the
privacy interest attached to an individual's luggage and is therefore not
tantamount to a search.65 While the court acknowledged that individu-
als have a protectable privacy interest in their personal luggage, it rea-
soned that because the luggage is not opened and the sniffing discloses
only narcotics, the only privacy interest intruded on is that associated
with the secret possession of illegal substances.66
Various state courts also approve the use of police trained detection
dogs. Courts in Arizona and Washington have held as permissible
under the fourth amendment dragnet sniff searches of airport lug-
gage.67 In State v. Morrow,68 the Arizona Supreme Court, agreeing
with the Second Circuit in Bronstein, reasoned that a dog's sniff is not a
search and therefore it is immaterial whether there was prior reason-
able suspicion.69 The court, however, also applied the plain view doc-
trine and concluded that if the officer was lawfully on the premises
where the search was conducted, the dog's detection of contraband is
analogous to a police officer's detection through the use of his own
senses.7" Similarly, in State v. Wolohan,7" the Washington Court of
Appeals reasoned that because the sole purpose of the dog sniff was to
detect contraband, there was no violation of a reasonable expectation
of privacy.72
64. 682 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3919 (U.S. June 27, 1983).
65. Id at 373.
66. Id The court stressed the fact that the sniffing is confined to the exterior of the luggage
and is less inconvenient and humiliating for the owner than other less discriminating and more
intrusive methods of investigation. ld
67. State v. Morrow, 128 Ariz. 309, 312, 625 P.2d 898, 901 (1981); State v. Wolohan, 23 Wash.
App. 813, 818, 598 P.2d 421, 424 (1979).
68. 128 Ariz. 309, 625 P.2d 898 (1981).
69. Id. at 312, 625 P.2d at 901. Dogs were used regularly in dragnet sniff searches of all
domestic luggage in the Tucson International Airport. The court held that a dog sniff of the air
around a bag or parcel is not a search for fourth amendment purposes. Id.
70. Id. at 313, 625 P.2d at 902. The court quoted Bronstein stating:
If the police officers here had detected the aroma of the drug through their own olfactory
senses, there could be no serious contention that their sniffing in the area of the bags
would be tantamount to an unlawful search (citations omitted). We fail to understand
how the detection of the odoriferous drug by the use of the sensitive and schooled canine
senses here employed alters the situation and renders the police procedure constitution-
ally suspect.
Id. at 313, 625 P.2d at 902 (quoting United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 461 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1975). See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
71. 23 Wash. App. 813, 598 P.2d 421 (1979).
72. Id. at 818, 598 P.2d at 424. A detective and a police-trained dog were on duty daily in the
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The California Courts of Appeals addressed the issue of dragnet dog
sniff searches in People v. Williams73 and People v. Evans.74 In both
cases the lower courts held the dog sniffing to be an unconstitutional
search within the meaning of the fourth amendment.75 In People v.
Matthews, 76 the California Court of Appeals retreated from its position
in Williams and Evans, permitting a dragnet sniff search77 but for a
reason wholly unrelated to the use of the dog. The court based its
holding on the fact that the sniff search was an unintrusive customs
search in a border area78 and as such, did not require even reasonable
parcel areas of mass transportation depots in Phoenix, Arizona, searching for controlled sub-
stances. Id at 814, 598 P.2d at 422. The dog alerted the police to a package which was addressed
to Wolohan. Id. In affirming Wolohan's conviction for possession of marijuana the Court de-
clined to follow the California Court of Appeals in People v. Evans, 65 Cal. App. 3d 924, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 436 (1977) and People v. Williams, 51 Cal. App. 3d 346, 124 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1975), noting
that the sniff is a minimal and limited intrusion and the contents of the bag remain entirely unde-
tected except for concealed narcotics. 23 Wash. App. at 817, 598 P.2d at 423-24. The court con-
cluded that there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in the area in which the bag is
located nor in the air immediately surrounding the bag. Id.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge McInturff cited the numerous cases which required a reason-
able suspicion regarding the presence of contraband prior to employing a police-trained detector
dog to support his conclusion that this "sniffing expedition" violated the fourth amendment. He
reiterated the long-established notion that the essential purpose of the fourth amendment is to
impose a standard of "reasonableness" on the exercise of discretion by government officials in
order to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions. Therefore,
the permissibility of a particular government practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the
mdividual against its promotion of a legitimate governmental interest. Id. at 823-25, 598 P.2d at
426-28.
73. 51 Cal. App. 3d 346, 124 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1975).
74. 65 Cal. App. 3d 924, 134 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1977).
75. Id. at 933, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 441, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 350, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 255. In Wl-
hams, the police were held to be trespassing when they conducted an unauthorized general dog
sniff in a secured baggage area of an airline terminal. Id, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 255. The court held
that no probable cause to suspect the presence of contraband existed prior to the dogs "nosing it
out," and as a result, the sniff search was unconstitutional. Id.
In Evans, police-trained dogs were used to sniff the outside of all mini-warehouses in a storage
complex. 65 Cal. App. 3d at 928, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 437. The court concluded that as a result of the
trial record's silence regarding any preknowledge of the presence of contraband, the dog sniff was
exploratory in nature and therefore a violation of the fourth amendment. Id at 933, 134 Cal.
Rptr. at 441. The court distinguished Evans from cases where the dog sniff was merely an in-
dependent investigation corroborating a tip from a reliable informant. Id. at 933-34, 134 Cal.
Rptr. at 441-42. The court stressed that because the informant's tip serves as a reasonable basis
upon which to suspect the presence of contraband, the use of a dog is no longer indiscriminate but
rather solely directed to the particular contraband. Id. at 936, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
76. 112 Cal. App. 3d 11, 169 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1980).
77. Id. at 20, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 268. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
78. 112 Cal. App. 3d at 18-19, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 267-68.
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79suspicion.
In People v. Mayberry,80 the California Supreme Court held8' that a
dragnet sniffing expedition at a public airport did not violate the fourth
amendment protection against unreasonable searches. 82 Rejecting the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Beale, the court held that an individual
can have no protectible privacy interest in illegal narcotics.8 3 The court
recognized a significant distinction between the sanctity of private lug-
gage which contains personal effects and luggage which is used to con-
ceal illegal narcotics.84
The court, citing with approval the Fifth Circuit decision in Gold-
stein, affirmed the notion that passengers' reasonable expectation of
privacy does not extend to the airspace surrounding their luggage.85
The court applied the plain view doctrine and likened the escaping
smell of narcotics to the emanation of fluid leaking from a container.
8 6
In concluding that any privacy right is lost when a substance escapes
into the surrounding area, the court found no constitutionally signifi-
cant difference in the odor being detected by a dog or by a human.
8 7
In her dissent, Chief Justice Bird vigorously argued that dog sniff
79. Id The dog was used in a car terminal at the Port of Long Beach, which the court
reasoned to be part of the "border area" which "includes not only land border crossing check-
points, but also checkpoints at all ports of entry." Id. at 17, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 266. The court
explained that the term "border search" is merely a "shorthand way of defining the limitation that
the Fourth Amendment imposes upon the right of customs agents to search without probable
cause." Id at 18, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 267. The court went on to note that while an intrusive border
search must meet federal fourth amendment reasonableness standards, this search was nonintru-
sive and as such, no suspicion was necessary. Id. at 18-19, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 267. See also Klein v.
United States, 472 F.2d 847, 849 (9th Cir. 1973) ("a border search is not one where probable cause
is required"); Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967) ("mere fact that a
person is crossing the border is sufficient cause for a search"); People v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.
App. 3d 523, 530, 109 Cal. Rptr. 143, 148 (1973) ("not even suspicion required to justify a nonin-
trusive inspection of persons, their vehicles and effects at a border-crossing") (quoting Henderson,
390 F.2d at 808). For an in-depth discussion of probable cause and border searches, see W.
LAFAVE, supra note 3, at § 3.1-.5, 10.5.
80. 31 Cal. 3d 335, 644 P.2d 810, 182 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1982).
81. The court's holding was a five to one decision. Id. at 343, 644 P.2d at 814, 182 Cal. Rptr.
at 621.
82. Id at 337, 644 P.2d at 811, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
83. Id. at 341, 644 P.2d at 813, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 620. The court concluded, therefore, that
there can be no legitimate objection to an unintrusive inspection which reacts only to such contra-
band. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 341-42, 644 P.2d at 814, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
86. Id. "The odor is detectable by the nose, as the leak is visible to the eye." Id.
87. Id. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
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inspections always constitute searches within the meaning of the fourth
amendment.88 Chief Justice Bird disagreed with the majority's conclu-
sion that odors escaping from a suitcase and fluid leaking from a
container are analogous.8 9 The Chief Justice pointed out that although
the fluid becomes, as a result of the leak, visible to the human eye, the
escaping odor remains undetectible to the human nose.90 In noting
that a narcotics detection dog perceives odors totally undetectible to
humans, Chief Justice Bird concluded that sniffing dogs "are like elec-
tronic listening devices which pick up sounds inaudible to the human
ear."' I Citing Katz, Sanders, Chadwick, and Bronstein, the Chief Jus-
tice stressed that the "hallmark" of any intrusive search into a closed
area is the detection of something otherwise hidden from human
92view.
By holding dragnet sniff searches permissible under the fourth
amendment, the California Supreme Court made a sharp, unexplained
break from a consistent line of decisions of courts of appeals of the
state.93 Its decision virtually excludes from judicial control police ac-
tivity which unquestionably invades personal privacy.94 While the
court correctly points out that canine sniffing of property is a minimally
intrusive and highly discriminating way for the police to gather infor-
mation of great value in the detection of easily hidden contraband,95 it
ignores a vast body of precedent which has established that the impor-
tant factor in determining a fourth amendment search is not the rela-
tive accuracy of the sensing device but the intrusion into a closed area
and disclosure of that which is otherwise hidden from human
detection.96
88. 31 Cal. 3d at 352, 644 P.2d at 820, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 627 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 351, 644 P.2d at 819-20, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 626-27.
90. Id. The Chief Justice concluded that this is clearly not a plain smell case. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 350, 644 P.2d at 819, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
93. See, e.g., People v. Denman, 112 Cal. App. 3d 1003, 169 Cal. Rptr. 742 (1980); People v.
Nagdeman, 110 Cal. App. 3d 404, 168 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1980); People v. Lester, 101 Cal. App. 3d 613,
161 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1980); People v. Evans, 65 Cal. App. 3d 924, 134 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1977); People
v. Williams, 51 Cal. App. 3d 346, 124 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1975); People v. Furman, 30 Cal. App. 3d
454, 106 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1973).
94. See W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, at 286. "[I]n every case in which the trained canine nose
has been used in such an indiscriminate fashion, the court has without hestiation held that such
mu a search and that the search was unreasonable under the fourth amendment." Id. (emphasis
in original).
95. 31 Cal. 3d at 341, 644 P.2d at 813, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
96. Eg., United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1975);
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The court's application of the plain view doctrine is, as the dissent
points out,97 unpersuasive. The sniffing by a dog is unquestionably dif-
ferent from the sniffing by a human being. Trained dogs are able to
detect odors well outside the range of human sensory perception.98
While it is well established that use of an aid to perception does not
always render an investigation a search,99 the vital distinction to be
made is whether the aid permits an officer to detect data otherwise im-
perceptible to human sense or whether it is simply a more efficient
method for detecting that which could be detected through the use of
the officer's own senses.10°
The Mayberry court's conclusion that placing illegal narcotics in pri-
vate luggage strips the luggage of its protectable privacy interest sum-
marily rejects the Supreme Court's holdings in Chadwick and
Sanders.10 1 Focusing on the nature of the contents of luggage rather
than blanketly classifying it as "personal" is a logical way to measure
the reasonable privacy expectation associated with that luggage. The
problem with this approach, however, is that it will require the search
of all luggage before determining which pieces are deserving of the
lower level of privacy protection. As such, this method is certainly
inconsistent with the notion of expanding and safeguarding the protec-
tions afforded by the fourth amendment. 102
• The current split of authority concerning the permissibility of drag-
net sniff searches under the fourth amendment calls for a response from
the Supreme Court. l' The Mayberry opinion unfortunately fails to
provide the insight needed for balancing the public interest in safe-
supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text. Virtually all commentators on the subject agree that
reliance on a trained canine nose to detect that which the police officer could not discover by use
of his own senses constitutes a search. E.g., W. LAFAvE, supra note 3, at 282 n.166. See also
Peebles, The Uninvited Canine Nose and the Right to Privacy: Some Thoughts on Katz and Dogs,
I I GA. L. REv. 75 (1976); Note, ConstitutionalLimitations on the Use of Canines to Detect Evidence
of Crime, 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 973 (1976); United States v. Soils: Have the Government Supersnif-
fers Come Down with a Case of Nasal Congestion, 13 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 410 (1976).
97. 31 Cal. 3d 350, 644 P.2d at 819, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 626 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
98. See supra note 54.
99. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
101. See 31 Cal. 3d 350, 644 P.2d at 819, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 626 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
102. See notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
103. Many commentators have repeated Lederer's query, "Where indeed will reasonable
means to search stop and 1984 begin?" Lederer & Lederer, Admissibility of Evidence Found by
Marijuana Detection Dogs, THE ARMY LAWYER, DA PAM 27-50-4, 11 (April 1973).
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guarding privacy with the state's desire for more efficient methods of
crime detection.
[Just prior to the publication of this Comment the Supreme Court
held in United States v. Place that the exposure of a traveler's luggage
to a police-trained narcotics detection dog did not constitute a search
within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
The precise issue before the Court in Place was whether the warrant-
less seizure and prolonged detention of luggage on less than probable
cause violated the fourth amendment. The Court unanimously af-
firmed the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' conclusion that the pro-
longed detention of defendant's luggage exceeded the permissible
limits of an investigative stop under the standards first defined in Terry
v. Ohio. Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, went further, how-
ever, and held that the exposure of luggage in a public place to a canine
sniff test is not a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
She concluded, without advertence or citation to any lower federal or
state court decisions on the issue, that a canine sniff is a peculiarly lim-
ited search, both in the manner in which the information is obtained-
it avoids the embarrassment and inconvenience that ordinarily accom-
panies other investigative methods-and in the content of the informa-
tion revealed by the procedure-it discloses only the presence of
contraband items.
Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun concurred in the judg-
ment, but strongly disapproved of the Court's resolution of the sniff
search issue. Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined,
pointed out that the issue was neither briefed nor argued before the
Court. Noting that "[a] dog adds a new and previously unobtainable
dimension to human perception," Justice Brennan indicated his prefer-
ence that the question of sniff searches of inanimate objects be left for
later cases.
Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Marshall also joined, thought
the issue too complex for the Court's cursory treatment, and argued
that two cases in which certiorari was currently pending would better
afford the Court a full airing of the issue.]
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